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Data Mining Journal Entries for Fraud Detection: A Replication 
of Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) Techniques 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is limited published research to detect financial statement fraud using digital 
analysis to analyse journal entry data. As far as we are aware, Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) 
study is the first and only such study. In this study, we replicated and extended Debreceny 
and Gray’s (2010) work by examining generalizability of their techniques beyond subjects 
from USA. Besides Chi-Square test, we also explored the use of mean absolute deviation 
method during digital analysis. We found Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) techniques useful 
in facilitating cross-sectional analysis for journal entry data sets that are based on multiple 
organizations. Our results confirmed that their techniques offered a comprehensive and 
systematic way of applying digital analysis on journal entries in a new setting. Our analysis 
also found that researchers should not rely solely on Benford’s Law during digital analysis 
because of potential false alarms. 
 
Keywords: fraud; journal entries; data mining; digital analysis; Benford’s Law. 
 
2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The alarming frequency of fraud occurrences suggests that corporations continue to 
face persistent threat of fraud (Cecchini et al., 2010a; Summers and Sweeney, 1998). 
According to Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE)’s 2014 Report, a typical 
organization may lose five per cent of its revenue to fraud every year. As such, the 
consequences of fraud may impact the shareholders, creditors, auditors and the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of corporations’ financial systems (Rezaee, 2005).  
Frauds can be classified into three primary categories: asset misappropriations, 
corruption and financial statement fraud (ACFE, 2014). The three different types of fraud 
would require different fraud detection techniques. For example, bank account 
reconciliation is a common control plan to detect incidents of employees stealing cash. For 
financial statement fraud, an emerging area that has attracted researchers’ attention is 
utilizing data analytics to detect “red flags” in the financial statement (Jans et al., 2010; 
Fanning and Cogger, 1998). 
This study focuses on financial statement fraud. In recent years, fraud detection has 
become a critical component of financial audits and audit standards have heightened 
emphasis on journal entries as part of fraud detection (Debreceny and Gray, 2010). SAS 
122 (AU-C sec. 240) requires auditors to conduct direct assessment of journal entries for 
fraud risk so that the integrity and validity of the financial results associated with these 
journal entries will not be compromised. Examples of financial statement fraud involving 
journal entries include back-posting journal entries, hiding/obscuring entries, manipulating 
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earnings, reserves and revenue, quarter-to-quarter timing issues and subverting approvals 
(Nieschwietz et al., 2000). 
To date, there is very little published research in detecting financial statement fraud 
using digital analysis to analyse journal entry data. Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) study is 
the first and only such study. Both Grabski (2010) and Kriel (2010) noted that the study 
was a valuable resource for auditors. To extend and contribute to this area of research, we 
have chosen to replicate and extend Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) digital analysis technique 
in detecting journal entry fraud. The replication and extension in this study was highly 
motivated by the need to replicate the technique in another setting beyond one specific 
dataset from USA. This is important because countries differ in levels of maturity in terms 
of corporate and data governance. As a result, data quality may differ among countries 
which in turn, have impact on data analysis work during fraud detection. Therefore, it is 
useful to replicate whether Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) technique can be applied in 
another dataset obtained from another setting outside USA. Another motivation for us that 
has methodological implication is to apply mean absolute deviation technique to our dataset 
during Benford analysis. This is motivated by Nigrini and Miller’s (2009) recommendation 
that mean absolute deviation should be used instead of Chi-Square test because the latter 
may result in statistically significant differences even when there is no substantive 
difference in data. The data we used is based on journal entries of 12 Singapore 
organizations from an anonymous Big 4 accounting firm in Singapore. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Fraud Detection 
Traditionally, fraud detection involves finding indicators of potential fraud, or red 
flags (Asare and Wright, 2004). To date, there have been many studies conducted in this 
research area. For instance, Pincus (1989) found that auditors using a standardized red flag 
program are less successful at correctly identifying fraud risk. Bell and Carcello (2000) 
developed a logistic regression model to estimate the likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting using red flag data. 
In addition, Hansen et al. (1996) constructed a generalized qualitative-response model 
to analyse management fraud. While such studies are useful in many ways, one major 
challenge of relying on red flags to identify fraud is that the presence of such symptom is 
not necessarily indicative of fraud (Albrecht and Romney, 1986) and investigation of such 
anomalies usually results in a conclusion that fraud was not the underlying cause. 
Perpetrators may also attempt to conceal their acts and ‘red flags’ may be relatively few in 
frequency and minor in amount (Hogan et al., 2008). Given the growing complexity, there 
is a need to explore innovative and efficient way of identifying such red flags. As a 
consequence, researchers have started to explore the use of data analytics to detect fraud 
(Jans et al., 2010).  
Forensic data analytics includes the use of digital analysis, data mining and data 
visualization (Ngai et al., 2011; Fanning and Cogger, 1998). Fraud detection, which 
increasingly relies on fraud data analytics, leverages on advanced technologies and 
techniques to extract and interpret information in order to uncover complex patterns and 
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indicators of possible fraudulent activities (Spathis et al., 2002). Data analytics allows for 
analysis of 100 per cent of the data at a much shorter time as compared to manual review 
and real time red flags can be identified with the use of continuous monitoring. Data 
analytics can also help companies broaden the range of exposure and increase the ability to 
uncover new patterns of fraudulent behaviour.  
Among various methods in forensic data analytics, one of the most commonly 
adopted methods is digital analysis using Benford’s Law (Cleary and Thibodeau, 2005; 
Nigrini, 1999; Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1997; Tackett, 2007). Given its potential to identify 
data points (e.g., transaction amounts) that contain characteristics associated with 
fraudulent activity, digital analysis using Benford’s Law has been proven to hold great 
promise in fraud detection process (Coderre, 1999). Durtschi et al. (2004) concluded that 
digital analysis can be a very useful tool for picking out potentially fraudulent accounts for 
further analysis when used correctly, but should not be overly dependent on such tests. 
According to these researchers, this technique should only be applied to suitable 
accounts which conform to the Benford distribution and should exercise great care in 
interpreting the results. Reddy and Sebastin (2012) added that this technique is useful 
where occurrence of digits in the data set deviate significantly from the expected 
frequencies. Further use of the Benford’s Law has also been discussed by Nigrini and 
Miller (2009), who suggested the use of second-order test. The second-order test involves 
the calculation of digit frequencies of the differences among the ordered values in a data 
set, which conforms to the digit frequencies of Benford’s Law. There is sufficient empirical 
evidence that suggests the frequencies of first and second digits of a data set that contains 
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credible numbers will indeed correspond to a Benford’s Law’s probability distribution 
(Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1997). 
 
Financial Statement Fraud Involving Journal Entries 
Fraud detection has become a critical component of financial audits and audit 
standards have heightened emphasis on journal entries as part of fraud detection 
(Debreceny and Gray, 2010). As accounting standards continue to evolve and grow in 
complexity, it is likely financial reporting will rely more on estimates and judgment. 
Although many corporations have invested in enterprise resource planning systems to 
automate financial reporting, these corporations still have hundreds – sometimes thousands 
– of manual journal entries being prepared, entered, reviewed and approved each month.  
In general, journal entries can be either routine transactions, non-routine transactions 
or estimation transaction. Routine transactions are recurring business activities that are 
recorded in the normal flow of transaction. Non-routine transactions are entries made 
periodically and are usually not part of the normal course of business. Estimation 
transactions usually involve management’s decision and judgment due to precise 
measurements. Non-routine transactions can possibly be entered in a corporation’s 
accounting systems on any day of the year by its employee, which makes it difficult and 
tedious to identify any potential fraudulent activities through manual means. In the case of 
routine journal entries, it is easy to identify the person who made such an entry and thus, 
the focus ought to be on the motive, opportunity and pressure that the individual is 
undergoing, in order to identify possible red flags. To better detect fraud, Lanza et al. 
(2007) highlighted the usefulness of data analytics for journal entry testing, especially in 
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the case of top-side journal entry. Debreceny and Gray (2010) believed that data mining 
could potentially improve both effectiveness and efficiency of auditors in their analysis of 
journal entries and fraud detection. 
Given the important role of fraud detection, the increasing emphasis on financial 
statement fraud involving journal entries and the fact that Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) 
study being the only paper published in this field so far, we believe there is a need to 
replicate Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) digital analysis technique before future research in 
this area moves to the next phase of development - theorization stage, as suggested by 
Grabski (2010). It is our aim to narrow this gap in the fraud detection literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we present descriptive analysis of 
journal entries. This is followed by a summary of the statistical analysis of journal entries. 
We then conclude by highlighting our contribution and future research opportunities. 
 
III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF JOURNAL ENTRIES 
Getting access to real-world journal entries data set is a major difficulty for 
researchers (Debreceny and Gray, 2010). Debreceny and Gray (2010) indicated that they 
were fortunate to have access to journal entries for 27 organizations from an anonymous 
software vendor. We were also fortunate to obtain access to manual journal entries for 12 
organizations from an anonymous Big 4 accounting firm. Due to clients’ confidentiality 
reasons, the Big 4 accounting firm removed all identifying information before providing the 
data set. The 12 organizations are labelled sequentially as Entity A, B, and so forth. All 
monetary amounts are in Singapore Dollars (1SGD is approximately 0.80 USD).  
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 12 set of charts of accounts. For this 
study, the average number of active accounts is 324, which is higher than the 164 reported 
in Debreceny and Gray (2010). This indicates that the charts of accounts in this study are 
more complex than Debreceny and Gray (2010). However, the maximum number of active 
accounts is much lower at 475, compared to 1,036 in Debreceny and Gray (2010). Table 2 
shows the number of transactions per active account for the 12 organizations. There are 
four organizations which have more than 500 average transactions per account: Entity L 
(3,649), Entity K (904), Entity F (578), and Entity I (504). 
 
Table 1: Active accounts in organizational chart of accounts. 
 
Minimum active accounts 184 
Maximum active accounts 475 
Median active accounts  335 
Average active accounts 324 
 
 
Table 2: Transactions per account in organizational chart of accounts. 
 
Entity Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
A 1 12,506 31 281 
B 1 12,229 51 328 
C 1 2,283 29 93 
D 1 23,528 47 310 
E 1 906 13 41 
F 1 66,607 47 578 
G 1 4,570 43 159 
H 1 906 43 78 
I 1 14,706 96 504 
J 1 2,839 44 171 
K 1 56,396 48 904 
L 1 81,675 339 3,649 
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Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 12 organizations. The first column 
shows the number of line items and it varies widely. There is a big difference between 
Entity L which has the highest number of line items (671,487) and Entity E which has the 
lowest number of line items (7,828). The same four entities which have the most number of 
transactions per account in Table 2 (Entity F, I, K and L) also have the most number of line 
items in Table 3. However, Entity K has a relatively lower dollar values ($7.4 million) 
compared to the other three entities. Although Entity A does not have a high number of line 
items (98,870), it has the highest total dollar values ($521 billion). Table 4 shows the 
number of line items per journal entry. There are two entities which have very large number 
of line items per journal entry: Entity L (11,126) and Entity F (7,006), indicating presence 
of “mega entries”. Debreceny and Gray (2010) suggested that such “mega entries” could be 
due to automatic journal entries that reverse prior-period adjusting journal entries or data 
transferred from subsidiary systems. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for organizations. 
 
Entity Number of line items Total line items $ Maximum line items $ 
A 95,870 521,482,242,735 1,882,075,421 
B 127,417 69,022,877,555 743,269,971 
C 25,903 4,313,833,127 38,508,133 
D 147,411 74,388,468,924 300,000,000 
E 7,828 1,709,511,347 73,168,000 
F 203,497 3,430,793,755 100,000,000 
G 52,135 45,286,821,791 145,014,787 
H 18,122 657,281,116 12,267,261 
I 200,465 14,674,615,034 52,827,698 
J 46,954 63,687,777,318 334,124,141 
K 397,021 3,356,572,444 7,392,861 
L 671,487 198,297,856,683 5,868,498,113 
Total 1,994,110 1,000,308,651,829  
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Table 4: Line items per journal entry. 
 
Entity Journal entries Mean Std Dev Min Max 
A 25,329 4 5 2 120 
B 29,836 4 19 2 593 
C 6,987 4 5 2 60 
D 24,842 6 15 2 368 
E 2,311 3 3 2 40 
F 23,006 9 125 2 7,006 
G 11,080 5 14 2 242 
H 3,429 5 13 2 156 
I 29,547 7 38 2 753 
J 12,044 4 9 2 173 
K 100,246 4 10 2 389 
L 123,876 5 140 2 11,126 
Total 392,533     
 
 
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JOURNAL ENTRIES 
This section examines the statistical analysis of the data set. 
First Digit 
Benford’s Law is one of the most widely-used digital analysis techniques to detect 
fraud (Benford, 1938; Debreceny and Gray, 2010; Nigrini and Miller, 2009; Nigrini and 
Mittermaier, 1997). Benford’s Law proposes an expected probability (Expected%) for the 
first digit of numbers in data sets as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Expected first digit distribution under Benford’s Law. 
 
Digit Probability 
1 30.1% 
2 17.6% 
3 12.5% 
4 9.7% 
5 7.9% 
6 6.7% 
7 5.8% 
8 5.1% 
9 4.6% 
 
Table 6 shows the actual probability (Actual%) for the first digit of numbers and the 
difference between the actual and expected probability (Diff = Actual% - Expected%) for 
the 12 organizations. The Chi-square and p-value for each entity are also shown. The 
results indicate that each of the 12 organizations has an actual probability of first digits that 
differs significantly from the Benford’s Law expected probability. This indicates many red 
flags which require further investigation by auditors. However, these results may not be 
useful practically to auditors as it does not address the “so-what” question. Even though 
there is a statistically significant difference between the actual and expected probability for 
each organization in this data set, how should auditors deal with practical concerns to 
extend the investigation? Does this mean that auditors should examine each of the 12 
organizations? Which of these 12 organizations should auditors extend their audit 
procedures? This may cause practical constraints for auditors as this data set consists of 
392,533 journal entries and 1,994,110 line items. In addition, most of the differences in this 
data set are below 1%. It may not be meaningful to conduct further investigation with such 
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small differences. This suggests that the Benford’s Law may not be useful in detecting 
fraud for this data set. 
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Table 6: Observed first digit distributions in journal entry database. 
 
Entity Data 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A Count 29,907 16,625 11,552 9,386 7,570 6,345 5,759 4,511 4,215 
=104.2 Act% 31.2% 17.3% 12.1% 9.8% 7.9% 6.6% 6.0% 4.7% 4.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 1.1% -0.3% -0.4% 0.1% 0% -0.1% 0.2% -0.4% -0.2% 
B Count 38,498 22,074 15,516 12,187 10,187 8,315 7,625 7,044 5,971 
=81.7 Act% 30.2% 17.3% 12.2% 9.6% 8.0% 6.5% 6.0% 5.5% 4.7% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.1% -0.3% -0.3% -0.1% 0.1% -0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 
C Count 7,640 4,514 3,331 2,538 2,005 1,901 1,614 1,192 1,168 
=44.5 Act% 29.5% 17.4% 12.9% 9.8% 7.7% 7.4% 6.2% 4.6% 4.5% 
P<0.0001 Diff -0.6% -0.2% 0.4% 0.1% -0.2% 0.6% 0.4% -0.5% -0.1% 
D Count 45,666 27,074 18,330 13,763 11,827 9,217 8,413 6,742 6,379 
=260.6 Act% 31.0% 18.4% 12.4% 9.3% 8.0% 6.3% 5.7% 4.6% 4.3% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.9% 0.8% -0.1% -0.4% 0.1% -0.4% -0.1% -0.5% -0.3% 
E Count 1,849 1,432 1,272 811 683 590 405 443 343 
=228.7 Act% 23.6% 18.3% 16.3% 10.4% 8.7% 7.5% 5.2% 5.7% 4.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff -6.5% 0.7% 3.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% -0.6% 0.5% -0.2% 
F Count 61,891 34,900 27,952 18,918 16,601 14,064 11,369 9,736 8,066 
=578.3 Act% 30.4% 17.2% 13.7% 9.3% 8.2% 6.9% 5.6% 4.8% 4.0% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.3% -0.5% 1.2% -0.4% 0.2% 0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.6% 
G Count 15,809 9,589 6,097 5,377 4,204 3,523 2,752 2,622 2,162 
=117.0 Act% 30.3% 18.4% 11.7% 10.3% 8.1% 6.8% 5.3% 5.0% 4.2% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.2% 0.8% -0.8% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% -0.5% -0.1% -0.4% 
H Count 5,489 3,321 2,199 1,445 1,456 1,370 960 966 916 
=101.6 Act% 30.3% 18.3% 12.1% 8.0% 8.0% 7.6% 5.3% 5.3% 5.1% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.2% 0.7% -0.4% -1.7% 0.1% 0.9% -0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 
I Count 60,419 35,020 25,924 19,155 1,6075 13,218 11,866 9,979 8,809 
=72.5 Act% 30.1% 17.5% 12.9% 9.6% 8.0% 6.6% 5.9% 5.0% 4.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0% -0.1% 0.4% -0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1% -0.1% -0.2% 
J Count 14,976 8,131 5,260 4,348 3,640 3,483 2,644 2,426 2,046 
=171.2 Act% 31.9% 17.3% 11.2% 9.3% 7.8% 7.4% 5.6% 5.2% 4.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 1.8% -0.3% -1.2% -0.4% -0.2% 0.7% -0.2% 0.1% -0.2% 
K Count 136,981 74,076 41,618 27,453 26,206 19,991 22,738 24,595 23,363 
=12,128.3 Act% 34.5% 18.7% 10.5% 6.9% 6.6% 5.0% 5.7% 6.2% 5.9% 
P<0.0001 Diff 4.4% 1.1% -2.0% -2.8% -1.3% -1.7% -0.1% 1.1% 1.3% 
L Count 208,400 104,220 75,502 48,200 74,741 33,223 65,120 24,446 37,635 
=40,911.7 Act% 31.0% 15.5% 11.2% 7.2% 11.1% 5.0% 9.7% 3.6% 5.6% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.9% -2.1% -1.3% -2.5% 3.2% -1.8% 3.9% -1.5% 1.0% 
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As an alternative to the Chi-Square test employed in Debreceny and Gray (2010), this 
study examines the mean absolute deviation technique. Grabski (2010) argued that the 
mean absolute deviation technique should be used instead of the Chi-Square test. Grabski 
(2010) stated that it is expected for Chi-Square test to indicate statistical significance when 
there are many observations. Due to the large observations, it is likely that any small 
deviation from the expected probability will result in statistically significant results. Nigrini 
and Miller (2009) also recommended that the Chi-Square test should not be employed as it 
will result in statistically significant differences even when there is no substantive 
difference. 
Table 7 presents the total deviation and mean absolute deviation for the 12 
organizations. The results show that the mean absolute deviation value for each of the 12 
organizations was zero, indicating that there were no substantive differences between the 
actual and expected probability. Relying on the Benford’s Law alone in this study would 
have given rise to a false alarm. Researchers who are analysing journal entry data would be 
dealing with big data sets containing large observations. Thus they should not rely solely on 
the Benford’s Law and also consider the mean absolute deviation technique as 
recommended by Grabski (2010) and Nigrini and Miller (2009). 
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Table 7: Mean absolute differences for first digit distributions in journal entry database. 
 
Entity Total deviation Mean absolute deviation 
A 0.03 0.00 
B 0.02 0.00 
C 0.03 0.00 
D 0.03 0.00 
E 0.15 0.00 
F 0.04 0.00 
G 0.04 0.00 
H 0.05 0.00 
I 0.01 0.00 
J 0.05 0.00 
K 0.16 0.00 
L 0.18 0.00 
 
 
Last Digits 
Besides the first digit analysis, researchers also examined the last digits as fraudulent 
journal entries contain “round numbers or a consistent ending number” (CAQ 2008; 
Debreceny and Gray, 2010). Each number (0 to 9) is expected to have a uniform 
distribution of 10% for the last digits. Table 8 shows the actual probability of the fourth 
digit for all dollar amounts greater than $999. The results in Table 8 indicate that each of 
the 12 organizations has an actual probability of fourth digit that differs significantly from 
the expected uniform probability. For each of the 12 organizations, the biggest difference 
relates to the zero digit. Entity B has the biggest difference of 21.9% for the zero digit. 
Although this may suggests “round numbers or a consistent ending number” (CAQ 2008), 
it is also common for the fourth digit to be zero such as $1,000, $10,000, $100,000, etc. 
Thus, auditors need to identify situations in organizations that make certain digits appear 
more often, which may explain the higher actual probability. 
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Table 8: Observed fourth digit distribution in journal entry database. 
 
Entity Data 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A Count 10,013 3,993 4,607 4,254 4,113 4,778 4,234 4,099 4,555 4,092 
=6,145.7 Act% 20.5% 8.2% 9.5% 8.7% 8.4% 9.8% 8.7% 8.4% 9.4% 8.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 10.5% -1.8% -0.5% -1.3% -1.6% -0.2% -1.3% -1.6% -0.6% -1.6% 
B Count 20,876 4,764 4,789 4,769 4,952 6,779 4,852 4,734 4,749 4,267 
=35,393.9 Act% 31.9% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 10.3% 7.4% 7.2% 7.3% 6.5% 
P<0.0001 Diff 21.9% -2.7% -2.7% -2.7% -2.4% 0.3% -2.6% -2.8% -2.7% -3.5% 
C Count 2,233 1,325 1,338 1,363 1,231 1,301 1,357 1,430 1,126 1,313 
=591.0 Act% 15.9% 9.5% 9.6% 9.7% 8.8% 9.3% 9.7% 10.2% 8.0% 9.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 5.9% -0.5% -0.4% -0.3% -1.2% -0.7% -0.3% 0.2% -2.0% -0.6% 
D Count 9,720 4,455 4,682 4478 5,112 5,123 5,148 4,468 4,645 4,463 
=4,430.7 Act% 18.6% 8.5% 9.0% 8.6% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 8.5% 8.9% 8.5% 
P<0.0001 Diff 8.6% -1.5% -1.0% -1.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -1.5% -1.1% -1.5% 
E Count 636 272 329 350 292 309 373 235 367 266 
=332.3 Act% 18.5% 7.9% 9.6% 10.2% 8.5% 9.0% 10.9% 6.9% 10.7% 7.8% 
P<0.0001 Diff 8.5% -2.1% -0.4% 0.2% -1.5% -1.0% 0.9% -3.1% 0.7% -2.2% 
F Count 16,337 4,960 4,418 4657 5,798 5,625 5,113 4,779 5,150 4,508 
=19,148.8 Act% 26.6% 8.1% 7.2% 7.6% 9.5% 9.2% 8.3% 7.8% 8.4% 7.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 16.6% -1.9% -2.8% -2.4% -0.5% -0.8% -1.7% -2.2% -1.6% -2.6% 
G Count 5,720 2,409 2,979 2,780 2,571 2,799 2,976 2,664 2,760 2,515 
=2,792.0 Act% 19.0% 8.0% 9.9% 9.2% 8.5% 9.3% 9.9% 8.8% 9.2% 8.3% 
P<0.0001 Diff 9.0% -2.0% -0.1% -0.8% -1.5% -0.7% -0.1% -1.2% -0.8% -1.7% 
H Count 1,462 657 714 679 620 846 877 780 621 680 
=715.2 Act% 18.4% 8.3% 9.0% 8.6% 7.8% 10.7% 11.0% 9.8% 7.8% 8.6% 
P<0.0001 Diff 8.4% -1.7% -1.0% -1.4% -2.2% 0.7% 1.1% -0.2% -2.2% -1.4% 
I Count 21,709 8,463 9,288 8,512 8,846 10,384 8,853 8,806 8,920 8,622 
=14,539.9 Act% 21.2% 8.3% 9.1% 8.3% 8.6% 10.1% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.4% 
P<0.0001 Diff 11.2% -1.7% -0.9% -1.7% -1.4% 0.1% -1.3% -1.4% -1.3% -1.6% 
J Count 2,724 2,508 2,545 2,352 2,322 2,434 2,714 2,438 2,526 2,502 
=63.9 Act% 10.9% 10.0% 10.2% 9.4% 9.3% 9.7% 10.8% 9.7% 10.1% 10.0% 
P<0.0001 Diff 0.9% 0% 0.2% -0.6% -0.7% -0.3% 0.8% -0.3% 0.1% 0% 
K Count 23,625 6,419 7,024 5,890 7,654 7,621 7,160 7,027 7,403 6,150 
=29,564.1 Act% 27.5% 7.5% 8.2% 6.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.3% 8.2% 8.6% 7.2% 
P<0.0001 Diff 17.5% -2.5% -1.8% -3.1% -1.1% -1.1% -1.7% -1.8% -1.4% -2.8% 
L Count 74,171 27,411 29,963 25,689 26334 27,680 24,788 24,132 25,982 24,704 
=67,208.3 Act% 23.9% 8.8% 9.6% 8.3% 8.5% 8.9% 8.0% 7.8% 8.4% 8.0% 
P<0.0001 Diff 13.9% -1.2% -0.4% -1.7% -1.5% -1.1% -2.0% -2.2% -1.6% -2.0% 
 
The Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) dip test of unimodality can also be used to 
investigate the last three digits (Debreceny and Gray, 2010). The last three digits range 
from zero to 999. Table 9 shows the dip test results for the 12 organizations. Except for 
Entity J (p-value = 0.099), each of the organizations had statistically significant dip test 
values where p <0.01. 
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Table 9: Last three digits – dip test. 
 
Entity N Dip p Low High Mean 
A 48,738 0.006 0.000 0 0 0 
B 65,531 0.008 0.000 0 0 0 
C 14,017 0.008 0.000 0 0 0 
D 52,294 0.008 0.000 0 0 0 
E 3,429 0.017 0.001 247 301 276.3 
F 61,345 0.012 0.000 0 0 0 
G 30,173 0.006 0.001 0 0 0 
H 7,936 0.010 0.001 0 200 99.0 
I 102,403 0.008 0.000 0 0 0 
J 25,065 0.004 0.099 0 0 0 
K 85,973 0.010 0.000 0 0 0 
L 310,854 0.013 0.000 0 0 0 
 
 
Debreceny and Gray (2010) stated that the number of journal entries may be too high 
to be investigated using the Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) dip test. They recommended that 
the results have to be considered together with the number of accounts involved. They also 
indicated that investigators should focus on those journal entries that have high deviation 
from the expected distribution and involving a relatively small number of accounts. 
Otherwise, the investigation cost will be too high. 
We followed the methods of Debreceny and Gray (2010). First, we selected the last 
three digits of all line items greater than $1,000. Second, we identified the five most 
common sets of last three digits. Next, we plotted the proportion of these five most 
common sets against the number of accounts involved (see Figure 1). Figure 2 includes 
only those journal entries totalling at least $1,000. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of journal entries to number of accounts line items greater than $1,000 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of journal entries to number of accounts journal entries greater than $1,000 
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Based on Figures 1 and 2, it appears that there is no entity which exhibits high 
deviation from the expected distribution and involving a relatively small number of 
accounts. This suggests that the investigation cost of checking the last three digits may be 
high for this study. This is unlike the findings in Debreceny and Gray (2010) which 
reported four entities exhibiting high deviation (30 to 60% deviation) and involving a 
relatively small number of accounts (less than 40 accounts). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we have replicated and extended Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) work by 
examining generalizability of their technique beyond one specific dataset from USA. We 
believe it is important to replicate Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) technique given that it is 
the first and only study published in this area so far. Besides Chi-Square test, we also 
explored the use of mean absolute deviation method during digital analysis. We found 
Debreceny and Gray’s (2010) technique useful in facilitating cross-sectional analysis for 
journal entry data sets that are based on multiple organizations. Our results confirmed that 
their technique offered a comprehensive and systematic way of applying digital analysis on 
journal entries in a new setting. Our analysis also found that researchers should not rely 
solely on Benford’s Law during digital analysis because of potential false alarms.  
A limitation of this study is the generalizability of the findings to other data sets. This 
study involved journal entries of 12 organizations from an anonymous Big 4 accounting 
firm. A major difficulty for researchers in this research area is getting access to real-world 
journal entries data set. As the obtained data set will typically exclude all identifying 
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information, researchers are unable to examine other variables such as the size of the 
company and industry. In addition, it is unlikely for external users such as financial 
analysts, investment managers and government regulators to obtain internal journal entries 
data set. Thus, external users need to explore other data mining techniques using publicly-
available data such as the annual report. One possibility is to use text analytics to examine 
the annual report (Cecchini et al., 2010b; Goel et al., 2010; Li, 2008). Besides the few 
pages of financial statements, the rest of the annual report consists of text including the 
CEO and Chairman’s Letter to the Stockholders, Management Discussion and Analysis and 
the Notes to the Financial Statements. Li (2008) found that companies with lower earnings 
produce annual reports that are harder to read, suggesting that companies may be 
opportunistically structuring the annual reports to hide adverse information from investors. 
Goel et al. (2010) also analyzed the text in the annual report to detect fraud and their results 
indicated that using linguistic features is an effective mean for fraud detection. Cecchini et 
al. (2010b) analyzed Management Discussion and Analysis sections of annual reports and 
created a dictionary of discriminating concepts to detect fraud. Text analytics can also be 
applied on the tone of companies’ earnings press releases (Huang et al, 2014). Huang et al, 
2014 found that companies use strategic tone management to mislead investors about firm 
fundamentals. 
We hope other researchers will complement our work. There are some related 
research questions to be investigated. For example, future research should focus on theory 
development. With theorizing, it may offer insights to identifying what are the 
characteristics of a fraudulent event and what are the most suitable data mining techniques 
to detect fraud. Another limitation is that using digital analysis to analyse journal entry data 
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may not be applicable for all types of frauds. Different types of fraud (asset 
misappropriations, corruption and financial statement fraud would require different fraud 
detection techniques. Essentially, the aim is to offer more information on how to mine 
journal entries in an optimal manner. Another future research may involve planting seeded 
errors in the journal entry data set and using digital analysis techniques to identify these 
seeded errors. 
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